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EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION REDUX? 
SECTION 183 OF THE BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT AND RESPECTING 
THE ‘LEGISLATIVE WILL’1 OF PARLIAMENT 
Thomas G.W. Telfer* 
The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to rule on whether the American doctrine of 
equitable subordination is part of Canadian law. In Re US Steel, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
suggested in obiter that section 183 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) conferred upon 
courts the power to equitably subordinate a claim. This article focuses on the specific point of 
whether section 183 of the BIA provides the court jurisdiction in equity to subordinate a claim and 
alter the statutory priority scheme. Equitable jurisdiction found in section 183 of the BIA does not 
represent a broad power to reorder statutory priorities based on notions of fairness and good 
conscience. The section 183 jurisprudence simply does not support the obiter statement in US 
Steel. In interpreting section 183, Canadian courts have relied upon traditional doctrines of equity. 
To allow equitable subordination under section 183 would be an attempt to ignore the legislative 
will of Parliament and the BIA priority regime. There may be no need to import equitable 
subordination as there are existing provisions in the BIA which subordinate claims of the type 
often considered under the American doctrine of equitable subordination. Canadian law also 
effectively deals with creditor and insider misconduct through the oppression remedy and the new 
statutory duty of good faith. 
 
“[C]ourts should not use equity to do what they wish Parliament had done through legislation.” 
 
Re Indalex Ltd, 2013 SCC 6 (S.C.C.), at para. 82 (Deschamps J.) 
 
“Equality is the great object and virtue of the Bankruptcy Acts.” 
 
Farmers’ Mart Ltd v Milne [1915] A.C. 106 (H.L.), at p.115 (Lord Atkinson) 
 
 
1 Re Residential Warranty Co of Canada Inc, 2006 ABCA 293 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 20. 
* Professor and Teaching Fellow, Faculty of Law, Western University. Research Assistance provided by Stephanie 








The Supreme Court of Canada has “twice side-stepped making a ruling on the doctrine”2  
of equitable subordination leaving the matter “open for another day”.3 The American doctrine 
refers to “a form of equitable relief to subordinate the claim of a creditor who has engaged in 
inequitable conduct.”4 In effect, equitable subordination “permits a court to alter the statutory 
distribution scheme by moving a creditor down in the priority chain.”5 In 2016, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal6 held that equitable subordination had no application to the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act7 (CCAA). Strathy C.J.O. concluded that in the CCAA “there is no ‘gap’ in the 
legislative scheme to be filled by equitable subordination through the exercise of discretion, the 
common law, the court’s inherent jurisdiction or by equitable principles.”8 
This article has no quarrel with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s conclusion on equitable 
subordination and the CCAA. However, in obiter dictum the Court reasoned that equitable 
 
2 Janis Sarra, “Brueghel’s Brush: A Portrait of the CCAA” (2020), 64 Can. Bus. L.J. 72, at p. 89.  
3 Canada Deposit Insurance Corp v. Canadian Commercial Bank [1992] 3 S.C.R. 558 (S.C.C.), at para. 97; Sun 
Indalex Finance, LLC v United Steelworkers, 2013 SCC 6 (S.C.C.), at para. 77. Several articles have traced the case 
law developments on whether equitable subordination is part of Canadian law. Lawrence J. Crozier, “Equitable 
Subordination of Claims in Canadian Bankruptcy Law” (1992), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 40; Thomas G.W. Telfer, “Transplanting 
Equitable Subordination: The New Free-Wheeling Equitable Discretion in Canadian Insolvency Law” (2002), 36 Can. 
Bus. L.J. 36, at p. 54; Michael J. MacNaughton and Sam P. Rappos, “Equitable Subordination in Canadian Insolvency 
Law” (2008), Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 4; Jeremy Opolsky, “Intercorporate Debt and Equitable Subordination: One Case 
Forward and One Case Back” (2015), Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 2; H. Lance Williams, Alan Hutchens and Jared Enns, “Re-
ordering Priorities: A Review of Recent Jurisprudence Regarding the Categorization of Debt vs. Equity and Equitable 
Subordination” (2018), 7:2 J.I.I.C. 27. 
4 Re US Steel Canada Inc 2016 ONCA 662 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 91.  Re US Steel Canada Inc 2016 ONCA 662 (Ont. 
C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted 2017 CarswellOnt 3573; Re US Steel Canada Inc 2016 ONCA 662 (Ont. 
C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. discontinued [2016] SCCA No. 480. 
5 Natasha MacParland, “How Close is Too Close? The Treatment of Related Party Claims in Canadian Restructurings” 
(2004), Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 13.  On examples of misconduct in U.S. law see Bruce A. Markell, “Courting Equity in 
Bankruptcy” (2020), 94:2 Am. Bank. L.J. 227, at p. 249. 
6 Re US Steel , supra, footnote 4.  
7 R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36. 





subordination applied to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act9 (BIA). Strathy C.J.O. relied upon 
section 183 of the BIA which provides: 
183 (1) The following courts are invested with such jurisdiction at law and in equity 
as will enable them to exercise original, auxiliary and ancillary jurisdiction in 
bankruptcy and in other proceedings....10   
 
Strathy C.J.O. concluded:  
[I]f equitable subordination is to become a part of Canadian law, it would appear that 
the BIA gives the bankruptcy court explicit jurisdiction as a court of equity to ground 
such a remedy and a legislative purpose that is more relevant to the potential reordering 
of priorities.11   
 
No court has relied upon this dictum to equitably subordinate a claim. This article calls into 
question the dictum of the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
The focus of the article is on the specific point of whether section 183 of the BIA allows a 
court to equitably subordinate a claim and alter the statutory priority scheme. The origins of the 
American doctrine can be traced to the United States Supreme Court decision in Pepper v Litton 
in which Justice Douglas relied upon the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and held 
that subordination may simply be available as a result of the “violation of rules of fair play and 
good conscience by the claimant.”12 The article argues that section 183 of the BIA does not allow 
for the subordination of claims on some broader grounds of fairness and good conscience. The 
origins of section 183 suggest that it was never intended to be the source of a wide ranging 
discretion to alter priorities. Courts have relied upon section 183 of the BIA to invoke traditional 
 
9 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. It is beyond the scope of the paper to deal with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s reasoning on 
equitable subordination and the CCAA. For an analysis of the reasoning on the CCAA see works cited in footnote 11. 
10 Ibid., at section 183(1) [emphasis added]. 
11 Re US Steel, supra, footnote 4, at para. 104. The US Steel case has been considered in a number of articles, yet none 
explore the implications of the section 183 obiter statement. See e.g., Kelly J. Bourassa and James W. Reid, “Swift 
Justice? Use of Summary Trials in Restructuring Proceedings” (2017), Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 14; Andrew Kent and 
Caitlin Fell, “2009 Revisited” (2017), Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 17; Edward A. Sellers, “Developments and Trends in the 
Governance of Distressed Enterprises in Canadian Insolvency Proceedings: Who is Making Critical Decisions” 
(2018), Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 17. However, cf Williams, Hutchens and Enns, supra, footnote 3. 
12 Pepper v. Litton, 308 US 295 (1939), at p. 310. On a moral reading of the law in equity and how it is distinct from 





doctrines of equity such as specific performance and rectification. Jurisprudence from Quebec 
confirms that equity in section 183 is confined to conventional equitable principles as developed 
by the English Courts of Chancery, rather than broad principles of fairness.13  
Canadian courts have not relied upon their inherent jurisdiction under section 183 to 
subordinate claims. The courts have emphasized that inherent jurisdiction “cannot be used to 
negate the unambiguous expression of legislative will and moreover, because it is a special and 
extraordinary power, should be exercised only sparingly and in a clear case.”14 The alteration of 
statutory priorities through the doctrine of equitable subordination would not respect Parliament’s 
will as expressed in the BIA distribution scheme.  The equitable maxim of “equity follows the 
law” means that “equity may not depart from statute law.”15 To allow equitable subordination 
under section 183 would be an attempt to reorder the statutory priority scheme under the BIA. 
Further, US Steel did not consider the 1923 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal Re Orzy16 in 
which the court rejected the conclusion of the trial judge that principles of fairness and good 
conscience could alter bankruptcy priorities.17  Finally, there is no need to read in a power to 
equitably subordinate claims under section 183 of the BIA. There are existing provisions in the 
BIA which subordinate claims of the type often considered in the American doctrine of equitable 
 
13 Laura Coordes argues a “cabined notion of equity also indicates that bankruptcy equity does not exist for the purpose 
of doing ‘justice,’ broadly defined.”  Laura N. Coordes, “Narrowing Equity in Bankruptcy” (2020), 94 Am. Bank. L.J. 
303, at p. 324. 
14 Re Residential Warranty, supra footnote 1, at para. 20. 
15 Jill Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (London: Thomson Reuters, 2008), at pp. 30; J.D. Heydon et al, 
Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (Chatswood NSW: LexisNexis, 2015), at p. 71.  
See e.g., Strata Plan No VIS3305 v. Best 2000 BCSC 935 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 18; JM Voith GmbH v. Beloit Corp 
[1997] 3 F.C. 497 (C.A.), at para. 116. 
16 [1924] 1 D.L.R. 250 (Ont. C.A.). 
17 US Steel did not mention the 2003 decision in CC Petroleum Ltd v. Allen (2003), 46 C.B.R. (4th) 221 (Ont. C.A.), 
at para. 18, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the trial judge’s application of equitable subordination on 
the basis of “the uncertain state of the law on this point,” (overturning the trial judge’s order that a secured claim be 





subordination. Canadian law also effectively deals with creditor and insider misconduct through 
the oppression remedy and the new statutory duty of good faith.  
Part II of this article examines the origins of equitable subordination in US law. Part III 
considers why Parliament included jurisdiction in “law and equity” in the forerunner of section 
183 of the BIA. Part IV examines Quebec equity jurisprudence arising under section 183 which 
focuses on the traditional concepts of equity rather than broad principles of fairness. In Part V, the 
article examines the jurisprudence under section 183 of the BIA. In Part VI, the article deals with 
the maxim that equity follows the law. Part VII considers the functional equivalence of equitable 
subordination found in Canadian law. Part VIII concludes. 
II. THE AMERICAN ORIGINS OF EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION 
In 1978, the United States Congress added section 510(c) to the US Bankruptcy Code.  The 
provision inserted an express power to apply the principles of equitable subordination to 
“subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another 
allowed claim.”18 But equitable subordination has a much older heritage. Most trace the emergence 
of the doctrine to two US Supreme Court cases: Taylor v Standard Gas and Electric Co19 and 
Pepper v Litton.20  
Since the interpretation of “law and in equity” in section 183 is in issue for Canadian courts, 
it is instructive to examine the judgment of Justice Douglas in Pepper v Litton to determine the 
source of his authority to apply equitable subordination.  Justice Douglas began his judgment in 
 
18 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). Congress did not define equitable subordination allowing for case law to define the doctrine. 
Samantha Kidd, “A Distressing Dilemma: How the Bankruptcy Doctrines of Equitable Subordination and Vote 
Designation Affect Distressed Debt Investors in a Post Great Recession Economy” (2012), 10 Dartmouth L.J. 25, at 
p. 31. 
19 306 U.S. 307 (1939) as discussed in Telfer, supra footnote 3, at p. 40. In Taylor the court subordinated the claim of 
a parent against a subsidiary. 
20 Pepper, supra, footnote 12. In Pepper the court subordinated the claim of a dominant shareholder who had used his 





Pepper by quoting from section 2 of the US Bankruptcy Code which provided that Courts of 
Bankruptcy are “invested ‘with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to 
exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings.’”21 Justice Douglas held that “[b]y virtue 
of s 2 a bankruptcy court is a court of equity at least in the sense that in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the act, it applies the principles and rules of equity 
jurisprudence.”22 What were the “principles and rules of equity jurisprudence” for Justice 
Douglas? Equitable principles “have been invoked to the end that fraud will not prevail, that 
substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent substantial 
justice from being done.”23 This meant that “disallowance or subordination may be necessitated 
by certain cardinal principles of equity jurisprudence.”24 Justice Douglas concluded that “in the 
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy court has the power to sift the circumstances 
surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the 
bankrupt estate.”25 If “injustice” and “unfairness” were not broad enough, Justice Douglas claimed 
that “a sufficient consideration may be simply the violation of rules of fair play and good 
conscience by the claimant.”26  
It is important to recognize how the introduction of the doctrine of equitable subordination was 
a marked change in the law in 1939. In 1940, one author wrote that the decision in Pepper “came 
as a surprise to the Bar generally in the length that it went in holding that claims of officers, 
directors, and the like, of public corporations for back salaries were subject to equitable 
considerations.”27 Similarly in 1941 an author stated: “I do not know of any case that has extended 
 
21 Pepper, supra, footnote 12, at p. 304.  
22 Ibid., at p. 304. 
23 Ibid., at p. 305. 
24 Ibid., at p. 306. 
25 Ibid., at pp. 307–08. 
26 Ibid., at p. 310. 





the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court further than that has.”28 It would appear that “the violation 
of moral obligations” would lead the court to invoke equity to subordinate a claim and alter 
priorities.29  
The current accepted framework30 to analyze equitable subordination in US law comes from a 
three-part test from the Fifth Circuit in Re Mobile Steel:31  
(i) The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct;  
 
(ii) The misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or 
conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant;  
 
(iii) Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Act. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has placed limits on the doctrine through the third limb of the 
test. In United States v Noland,32 the Supreme Court characterized the last element of the three 
part test: “This last requirement has been read as a ‘reminder to the bankruptcy court that although 
it is a court of equity, it is not free to adjust the legally valid claim of an innocent party who asserts 
the claim in good faith merely because the court perceives that the result is inequitable.’”33 
But since Justice Douglas grounded his analysis in the law and equity jurisdiction in the US 
Bankruptcy Act a question for Canadian courts is whether section 183 of the BIA extends to broad 
principles of “injustice”, “unfairness” or “the violation of rules of fair play and good conscience” 
 
28 Alton W. Teale, “Recent Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect Bankruptcy” (1941), 15 J. Nat’l Ass’n 
Ref. Bankr. 80, at p. 80. See also Fred H. Kruse, “Tax Claims, Wage Claims and Inheritances” (1941), 15 J Nat’l 
Ass’n Ref. Bankr. 64, at p. 71 (power to subordinate was “absolute”). 
29 Asa S. Herzog and Joel B. Zweibel, “The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy” (1961), 15 Vand. L. 
Rev. 83, at p. 107.  
30 Janis Sarra, “Brueghel’s Brush: A Portrait of the CCAA” (2020), 64 Can. Bus. L.J. 72, at p. 89; David M. Holliday, 
“Cause of Action Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 510(c)(1) for Equitable Subordination of Claim in Bankruptcy” (2020), 78 
Causes of Action 2d 779 [Retrieved from WestlawNext Canada], at p. 12. The Supreme Court of Canada cited the 
three-part Mobile Steel test in its 1992 decision in Canada Deposit Insurance Corp v. Canadian Commercial Bank 
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 558 (S.C.C.). 
31 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977), at p. 700.  
32 517 U.S. 535 (1996). 





as found in Pepper v Litton. Canadian courts have long recognized that matters of justice and 
conscience are relevant to equitable relief.34  However, as discussed below, in the interpretation of 
“equity” in section 183 Canadian courts have not invoked fairness and good conscience as a source 
of discretion to alter the BIA priority scheme. Canadian courts have instead relied upon traditional 
doctrines of equity such as rectification and specific performance when interpreting section 183.  
Before considering section 183 jurisprudence it is instructive to examine the origins of the law and 
equity jurisdiction of Canadian courts found in the original Bankruptcy Act. 35 
III. THE ORIGINS OF S.183: “AT LAW AND IN EQUITY” 
In 1919, Canada enacted a new Bankruptcy Act.36 The drafter of the new legislation, HP 
Grundy, sought to follow the UK Bankruptcy Act of 1914.37 The original version of section 183 
could be found in section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act:  
The following named courts are constituted Courts of Bankruptcy and invested within 
their territorial limits as now established, or as these may be hereafter changed, with 
such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original, auxiliary 
and ancillary jurisdiction in bankruptcy.…38   
 
In drafting section 63, Grundy relied in part upon section 122 of the UK Bankruptcy Act of 1914 
which granted the High Court jurisdiction in bankruptcy and every officer of the court was to “act 
in aid of and be auxiliary to each other in all matters of bankruptcy.”39  But in the English 
Bankruptcy Act there is no specific reference to the UK High Court having jurisdiction in law and 
 
34 See e.g., Moore v. Sweet 2018 SCC 52 (S.C.C.), at para. 32. Canson Enterprises Ltd v. Boughton & Co, [1991] 3 
S.C.R. 534 (S.C.C.), at para. 54. For a review of conscience in equity see Graham Virgo, "Conscience in Equity: A 
New Utopia" (2017), 15 Otago. L. Rev. 1; Irit Samet, Equity: Conscience Goes to Market (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), chapter 1. 
35 S.C. 1919, c. 36. 
36 See Thomas G.W. Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) [Telfer, Ruin and Redemption].  
37 H.P. Grundy, “Synopsis of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act” (1919), 1 C.B.R. 325, at p. 327; Telfer, Ruin and 
Redemption, ibid., at p. 161.  
38 Bankruptcy Act, supra, footnote 35, section 63 [emphasis added]. There is no equivalent provision found in the 
Insolvent Act of 1869, S.C. 1869, c. 16 or in the Insolvent Act of 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 16.  





in equity. The Canadian Parliamentary Debates of 1919 reveal that MPs did not discuss the law 
and equity provisions.40  
 A key to understanding why Parliament inserted jurisdiction “at law and in equity” into the 
Bankruptcy Act is that in 1919 the government created new federal independent “Courts of 
Bankruptcy”. Parliament abolished the “Courts of Bankruptcy” 192241 but their short life explains 
the existence of the current wording of section 183. The 1919 legislation conferred upon Provincial 
superior courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy and “constituted them ‘Courts of Bankruptcy.’”42 During 
the life of the federal Courts of Bankruptcy, each provincial judge “wore two hats—a general 
jurisdiction hat and a bankruptcy hat.”43 As Honsberger and DaRe note the new Bankruptcy Court 
“was made out of whole cloth. It was an orphan with no antecedents, inheritance, accumulation of 
jurisdiction or history.”44 The authors argue that Parliament added section 63 in an attempt to make 
up for the newness of the court.  
In 1922, Chief Justice Meredith of the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that Parliament’s 
attempt to create new Courts of Bankruptcy was ultra vires.45 In that year Parliament abolished 
the Courts of Bankruptcy.46 Sir Lomer Gouin, the Minister of Justice, explained the changes to 
section 63: 
[A] doubt…exists in section 63 of the statute, which invests the provincial courts with 
jurisdiction. Under this section as it stands the view has been taken that federal courts 
are thereby established each of which has original jurisdiction in bankruptcy throughout 
Canada.…By striking out the words which purport to constitute the provincial courts 
into federal courts the doubt which exists will be cleared away.47 
 
40 House of Commons Debates, 9 May 1919, at 2268-2269 (debate over clause 63, “Court’s Jurisdiction”).  
41 An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1922, c. 8, section 8. 
42 Lewis Duncan and William John Reilley, Bankruptcy in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canadian Legal Authors), at p. 
795. 
43 John D. Honsberger and Vern W. DaRe, Honsberger’s Bankruptcy in Canada, 5th ed, (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 
2017) at p. 106. 
44 Ibid., at p. 102. 
45 Re Canadian Western Steel Corp (1922), 2 C.B.R. 494 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 27. See also Re Messervey's Limited 
(1922), 3 C.B.R. 480 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 1. 
46 An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1922, c. 8.  






Parliament agreed to strike out the reference to “Courts of Bankruptcy” and thus vesting 
jurisdiction in bankruptcy clearly within the existing provincial superior courts and “not on any 
Bankruptcy Court.”48 Senator Beique explained that the revised Act permitted “the administration 
of the Bankruptcy Act by the judges of the ordinary courts in each province....[T]here ceases to be 
any bankruptcy judge; the court ceases to be the Bankruptcy Court—it is the existing [provincial 
superior] court.”49 In 1925, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that there is no Court of 
Bankruptcy: “The so-called Court of Bankruptcy is merely the Superior Court of the Province... 
exercising jurisdiction under a statute which applies throughout Canada.”50 
When Parliament abolished the Courts of Bankruptcy in 1922, the original grant of 
jurisdiction found in section 63 remained leaving the wording to read “[t]he following courts are 
invested with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original, 
auxiliary and ancillary jurisdiction in bankruptcy”.51 That is the current wording of section 183 of 
the BIA.  Thus, the words “at law and in equity” stem from an attempt to bolster the jurisdiction 
of a Court which has long been abolished.  In 1922, there was no debate about the impact of leaving 
the courts with jurisdiction in “law and in equity.” Parliament must have assumed the jurisdictional 
 
48 Duncan and Reilley, supra, footnote 42, at p. 796. See Castor Holdings Ltd, Re (1999), CarswellQue 3486 (Que. 
S.C.), at para. 6; Smith Doll Toy Co, Re (1923), 4 C.B.R. 183 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 1. See Eagle River International 
Ltd, Re 2001 SCC 92 (S.C.C.), at para. 20. “Parliament decided to use the superior courts of the provinces and 
territories to exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction (section 183). The courts mentioned in section 183 retain their character 
as superior courts of inherent jurisdiction, but will be referred to here, perhaps with some imprecision of language, as 
the bankruptcy courts. 
49 Senate Debates, 24 June 1922, at p. 605 (Beique). See also House of Commons Debates, 22 May 1922, at p. 2036. 
Subsequent jurisprudence confirmed that there was no longer a separate “Bankruptcy Court”. See Bernard Boucher, 
“La juridiction de la Cour de faillite” (1994), 24 C.B.R. (3d) 61; Re Smith Doll Toy Co (1923), 4 C.B.R. 183 (Ont. 
S.C.), at para. 1; Turcotte v. Side (1936), 18 C.B.R. 47 (Que. K.B. on Appeal), at paras. 38-39; Re Arctic Gardens Inc 
(1989), 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (Que. C.A.), at para. 12; Mancini (Trustee of) v. Falconi (1987), 61 O.R. (2d) 554 (Ont. 
S.C.), at para. 5, aff’d. [1992] O.J. No. 3504 (C.A.). As a matter of convenience sometimes writers continue refer to 
a “bankruptcy court” even though there is no such separate court: Re Eagle River supra, footnote 48, at para. 20. See 
also PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc v. Perpetual Energy Inc 2021 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 184. 
50 Re Gilbert [1925] S.C.R. 275 (S.C.C.), at para. 11. 





grant “must mean something and that if deleted there could be a problem.”52 That something has 
never contemplated the re-ordering of priorities under the rubric of equity. An examination of the 
equity jurisprudence under section 183 and its predecessors confirms this point.   
IV. QUEBEC: TRADITIONS OF EQUITY VS FAIRNESS AND GOOD CONSCIENCE  
When Parliament sought to clarify that bankruptcy jurisdiction was vested in the provincial 
superior courts, the Bankruptcy Act listed Quebec as a province that had jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy “at law and in equity.” This created confusion because Quebec is a civil law 
jurisdiction.53 “[E]quity, derived as it is from English law, forms part of a tradition and a 
terminology that are foreign to Quebec civil law.”54 According to one author the Superior Court 
of Quebec and the Quebec Court of Appeal “has never had jurisdiction in equity in private law 
matters.”55   
Quebec courts grappled with how to interpret the law and equity jurisdiction and largely 
concluded that equity in section 183 of the BIA meant traditional forms of equity developed in 
England rather than principles of fairness and justice.56 In 125258 Canada Inc (Trustee) c Royal 
Bank,57 the Quebec Superior Court concluded: 
The term “equity” used in section 153 (1) [now section 183] of the Bankruptcy Act does 




52 Honsberger and DaRe, supra, footnote 43, at pp. 102-103. 
53 Ibid., at pp. 95, 99. 
54 Alain Vauclair and Martin-François Parent, “Harmonization of Federal Legislation with Quebec Civil Law: Some 
Examples from the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act” (Department of Justice Canada) at p. 10, online: 
<https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/harmonization/hfl-hlf/b8-f8/bf8a.pdf>.  
55 See Alain Vauclair and Annie Drzymala, “Some Legislative Policy Issues: Bijuralism and Drafting Support Services 
Group Legislative Services Branch Department of Justice Canada and Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy 
Directorate Industry Canada” (2003), 37 R.J.T. 145, at p. 153, note 16.  
56 Ibid., at note 14.  
57 [1986] R.J.Q. 1666 (Que. S.C.), at paras. 81-82 [125258 Canada Inc], aff’d [1990] R.J.Q. 1547 (Que. C.A.) 





The Court is therefore not justified in resorting to the principles of “fairness and good 
conscience” pursuant to section 153 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, that section only referred 
to English “equity”.58 
 
In 1992, the Quebec Court of Appeal confirmed this view in  Meublerie André Viger Inc c Wener:59 
Although some judgments have already been based on this provision to decide 
according to the standards of “fairness and good conscience.... I am of the opinion that 
the term “equity”...employed in art. 183 refers to the concept of “equity” in English law, 
as opposed to “fairness and good conscience”.60  
 
One Quebec judgment concluded that equity in section 183 must necessarily be “the set of legal 
rules and procedures developed in England, beginning in the fifteenth century, in response to the 
formalism of the ‘common law’”.61 Professor Bohémier in his text Faillite et Insolvabilité wrote: 
The word “equity” of article 183... does not have to be understood as the simple desire 
to make justice, fair treatment and good conscience prevail. Rather, it refers to a true 
system of law developed in English law outside the common law....  
 
Therefore, when a court acquires an equitable jurisdiction, that does not mean that it has 
complete freedom to seek any solution that appears to it equitable. On the contrary, it 
must refer to the fundamental principles of the equity system or to the solutions that 
have developed within this system.62 
 
In 2001, section 183(1.1) was added to specify that Quebec had the same powers as other 
jurisdictions, excepting the language “at law and in equity.”63 The Quebec Court of Appeal in Re 
Montreal Fast Print Ltd,64 considered the impact of the 2001 amendment: 
 
58 125258 Canada Inc, supra, footnote 57, at paras. 81-82.  See also Trustee of 9270-4378 Quebec Inc. 2020 QCCS 
400 (Que. S.C.), at para. 104. 
59 [1992] R.J.Q. 1461 (Que. C.A.), at para. 37 followed Re Perrette Inc. [1998] R.J.Q. 1015 (Que. C.A.), at para. 54; 
Re St-Jacques 1996 CarswellQue 1212 (Que. S.C.); Re Bedard [2005] R.J.Q. 1732 (Que. S.C.). However, cf Re Societé 
Petrochemique Kemtec Inc. [1994] R.J.Q. 1345 (Que. S.C.), at para. 61. 
60 Wener, supra, footnote 59, at para. 37. It is important to note that the Quebec Court of Appeal in Wener rejected 
earlier jurisprudence which had adopted a broader notion of equity to embrace matters of fairness and good conscience. 
Re Fredericton Co-operative Ltd (1921), 2 C.B.R. 154 (N.B.S.C.); Re Stanley and Bunting (1924), 5 C.B.R. 18 (Ont. 
S.C.); Re Duranceau (1954), 34 CBR 198 (Que. S.C.), rev’d on other grounds [1956] Que. Q.B. 80 (Que. Q.B.). 
61 Re Pogany, [1997] R.J.Q. 1693 (Que. S.C.), at para. 31 [translated by author]. See also Gagnon v. Montreal Trust 
Co (1971), 17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 136 (Que. S.C.), at para. 60 (referring to two systems of equity and common law); Syndic 
de Groupe Opex inc., 2020 CarswellQue 8362 (Que. S.C.), at para. 48; Syndic de 9270-4378 Québec inc., 2020 
CarswellQue 743 (Que. S.C.), at para. 104. 
62 Albert Bohémier, Faillite et Insolvabilité, Tome 1 (Montréal: Thémis, 1992), at p. 576 [translated by author]. Cited 
with approval in 3042073 Canada inc, Re [2000] R.J.Q. 1314 (Que. S.C.), at para. 74. 
63 Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4, section 33. See Lloyd W. Houlden, Geoffrey B. 
Morawetz and Janis P. Sarra, The 2017 Annotated Bankruptcy Act (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017), at p. 953. 





The deletion of the words “in equity” does not have the effect of restricting the 
jurisdiction of the Superior Court. This is a common law court, not a Court of 
Chancery....and it is not necessary...to import the concept of in equity jurisdiction... The 
change was expected, however, because for a civil law “equity” cannot replace the rule 
of law.65 
 
It is clear from the Quebec jurisprudence that equity is confined to traditional equitable 
doctrines developed in England66 and does not extend to larger concepts of fairness and good 
conscience that would allow for the re-ordering of priorities. In 1998, the judge at first instance in 
Re People’s Department Stores Ltd (1992) Inc67 held that the principles of equity provided for in 
section 183 “include the notions of fair play, justice, fairness, etc.”68 Such a broad principle was 
not accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in that case.69 Outside of Quebec, Canadian courts 
have relied upon traditional doctrines of equity when making an order under section 183.  
V. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE UNDER SECTION 183 
From the outset Canadian courts have recognized that in bankruptcy proceedings the court 
is a Court of Equity.70 In 1925, the Ontario Supreme Court acknowledged in Re Bryant Isard & 
Co71 that “[t]he Court in its bankruptcy jurisdiction is a Court of Equity just as much as is the Court 
in its ordinary jurisdiction, and it is just as much bound to give effect to equitable rights as is the 
Court in its ordinary jurisdiction.”72 Canadian courts have continued to recognize that in 
bankruptcy the court is a court of equity.73  
 
65 Re Montreal Fast Print Ltd [2003] J.Q. No. 7151 (Que. C.A.), at para. 70. 
66 See Re CA Macdonald & Co (1961), 2 C.B.R. (N.S.) 258 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 5, referring to “doctrines firmly 
grounded in English equitable jurisprudence.”  
67 (1998), 23 C.B.R. (4th) 200 (Que. S.C.). 
68 Re People’s Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc. (1998), 23 C.B.R. (4th) 200 (Que. S.C.), at para. 461.  
69 Re People’s Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc. 2004 SCC 68 (S.C.C.). 
70 On the debate in the United States on this point see Markell, supra, footnote 5, at p. 309. 
71 (1925), 5 C.B.R. 793 (Ont S.C.). 
72 Re Bryant Isard & Co (1925), 5 C.B.R. 793 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 7; See also Re Gold Medal Manufacturing Company 
Limited (1926), 8 C.B.R. 39 (Ont. S.C.), rev’d on other grounds (1927), 8 C,B,R, 169 (Ont. S.C.). 
73 Re Heron & Co (1933) O.R. 693, at para. 28 (Ont. S.C.); Interclaim Holdings Ltd v. Down, 1999 ABCA 329 (Alta. 
C.A.), at para. 37; Re Olympia & York Developments Ltd (1997), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 536 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.), at para. 





Conferring jurisdiction “in equity” enables courts to exercise their powers over traditional 
doctrines of equity. The general grant of equitable jurisdiction avoids the need to list specific 
equitable powers in the BIA.74 Canadian courts have “consistently applied principles of equity to 
the solution of problems in bankruptcy matters.”75 Thus, courts have exercised their equitable 
jurisdiction in section 18376 to (1) rectify a contract,77 (2)  grant an injunction,78 (3) order specific 
performance,79 (4) make declaratory judgments,80 (5) consolidate bankrupt estates81 and (6) grant 
relief from forfeiture.82 For example, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal recognized that an 
injunction “is an equitable remedy, which, in bankruptcy matters, may be granted by a Bankruptcy 
Court pursuant to section 183 of the BIA.”83 By invoking traditional doctrines of equity to fashion 
an order under section 183, there is no sense that courts have been drawing upon a broader power 
of the “rules of fair play” that would allow for the re-ordering of priorities through the doctrine of 
equitable subordination.84  
 
74  Herzog and Zweibel, supra footnote 29 at p. 84. See Re Kemtec Petroleum Corporation Inc, [1994] R.J.Q. 1345 
(Que. S.C.), at p. 1352 (no need for specific listing of equitable powers). 
75 Re Alliance Credit Corp (1971), 17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 136, at para. 37. 
76 Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, supra, footnote 63, at p. 953. 
77 Truestar Investments Ltd v. Baer 2018 ONSC 7372 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 17. 
78 See e.g., Re Walker Ranch Ltd (1996), 39 C.B.R. (3d) 70 (Sask. Q.B.), at para. 17; Re Leby Fixtures & Interiors Ltd 
2006 NBCA 93 (N.B.C.A.), at para. 20. 
79 See e.g., Re Triangle Lumber & Supply Co (1978), 27 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317 (Ont. S.C.); Re Western Canada Pulpwood 
& Lumber Co (1929), 38 Man. R. 378 (Man. C.A.); Canadian Credit Men's Trust Assn v. Edmonton Lumber Co 
(1930), 11 C.B.R. 376 (Alta. S.C.). 
80 See e.g., Fiorito v. Wiggins, 2016 ONSC 5822 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 30, aff’d 2017 ONCA 765 (Ont. C.A.); Re 
Reynolds (1928), 10 C.B.R. 127 (Ont. S.C.), aff’d (1928), 10 C.B.R. 127 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 131; Holley v. Gifford 
Smith Ltd (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). 
81 See e.g., Re A & F Baillargeon Express Inc (1993), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 36 (Que. S.C.); Ashley v. Marlow Group Private 
Portfolio Management Inc (2006), 22 C.B.R. (5th) 126 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]; Re Associated Freezers of 
Canada Inc (1995), 36 C.B.R. (3d) 227 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div); Re Gray Aqua Group of Companies, 2015 NBQB 107 
(N.B.Q.B.); Bacic v. Millennium Educational & Research Charitable Foundation 2014 ONSC 5875 (Ont. S.C.J.); Re 
Kitchener Frame Ltd 2012 ONSC 234 (Ont. S.C.J.); Re Redstone Investment Corp (Receiver of) 2016 ONSC 
4453(Ont. S.C.J.); Re Walker (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div). 
82 Re Stanley & Bunting [1924] 3 D.L.R. 599 (Ont. S.C.); Re Goldray Inc 2005 ABCA 341 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 22. 
83 Re Leby Fixtures & Interiors Ltd, 2006 NBCA 93 (N.B.C.A.), at para. 20. 
84 However, cf Lloyd’s Non-Marine Underwriters v. JJ Lacey Insurance Ltd 2009 NLTD 148 (N.L.T.D.), discussed 
below. In Re Sellathamby 2020 BCSC 1567 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 73, the court stated that “I have jurisdiction under s. 
183 of the BIA to do “what is right and equitable in the circumstances of a case”.  The case did not involve the re-





Few cases have commented on the scope of section 183. Early cases confirmed that the 
jurisdiction under the equivalent provision in section 183 was broad.85 In Re Eagle River 
International Ltd, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the breadth of section 183.86 Justice 
Binnie linked section 183 to Parliament’s broad powers over bankruptcy and insolvency law in 
section 91 (21) of the Constitution Act and concluded that there was “broad jurisdiction” under 
section 183: 
It seems to me that the decided cases recognize that the word “Bankruptcy” in s. 91(21) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 must be given a broad scope if it is to accomplish its 
purpose. Anything less would unnecessarily complicate and undermine the economical 
and expeditious winding up of the bankrupt’s affairs. Creation of a national jurisdiction 
in bankruptcy would be of little utility if its exercise were continually frustrated by a 
pinched and narrow construction of the constitutional head of power. The broad scope 
of authority conferred on Parliament has been passed along to the bankruptcy court in 
s. 183(1) of the Act, which confers a correspondingly broad jurisdiction.87 
 
While it might be suggested that “broad jurisdiction” offers scope for equitable subordination, 
there is no discussion of equity in the case. The case concerned the other branch of section 183 
dealing with “original, auxiliary and ancillary jurisdiction.”88 It remains for the Supreme Court to 
clarify whether the broad jurisdiction in section 183 also includes broad equitable powers such as 
equitable subordination.  
 Some courts have confirmed that section 183 “preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the 
Superior Court sitting in BIA matters”.89 As pointed out by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Re 
Residential Warranty Co of Canada Inc: “Inherent jurisdiction is not without limits, however. It 
cannot be used to negate the unambiguous expression of legislative will and moreover, because it 
 
85 Re Tremblay (1922), 3 C.B.R. 488 (Que. S.C.), at para. 45 (“Undoubtedly, sec. 63 [now section 183] of The 
Bankruptcy Act gives to this Court the widest jurisdiction.”); Re Maritime Mining Co [1940] 2 D.L.R. 792 (N.B.S.C.), 
at para. 3 (“comprehensive jurisdiction). 
86Re Eagle River, supra, footnote 48. 
87 Re Eagle River, supra, footnote 48, at para. 38 [emphasis added].  
88 Re Eagle River, supra, footnote 48, at para. 17. The case is better known for establishing the single control principle 
in bankruptcy. See para. 76. See GMAC Commercial Credit Corp - Canada v. TCT Logistics Inc. 2006 SCC 35 
(S.C.C.), at para. 63; Re Dugas 2004 NBCA 15 (N.B.C.A.), at para. 23. 





is a special and extraordinary power, should be exercised only sparingly and in a clear case.” 90 A 
superior court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction in matters that are regulated by statute “if it 
can do so without contravening any such statutory provision.”91 Equitable subordination is 
inconsistent with the BIA priority scheme. No court has relied upon its inherent jurisdiction to 
equitably subordinate a claim.  
 Other courts have addressed head on whether section 183 gives courts the jurisdiction to 
alter statutory priorities. In Unisource Canada Inc v Hongkong Bank of Canada,92 Reilly J. referred 
to equitable subordination and concluded that “[a] Court presiding in bankruptcy clearly has an 
equitable jurisdiction (see section 183, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act)….However, barring 
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation, in my view the Court should exercise great caution in 
departing from the statutory scheme for distribution and relief.”93 In Re Burroughs,94 the court 
concluded that it did not “have jurisdiction to alter the distribution scheme in the BIA.95 
 One court purported to rely upon section 183 to equitably subordinate a claim.96  In 2009, 
the Newfoundland and Labrador Trial Division in Lloyd’s Non-Marine Underwriters v JJ Lacey 
Insurance Ltd97 recognized the doctrine of equitable subordination and applied the three-part 
 
90 Re Residential Warranty, supra, footnote 1, at para. 20 citing Baxter Student Housing Ltd v. College Housing Co-
operative Ltd, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475 (S.C.C.), at para. 6.  See also Petrowest Corporation v. Peace River Hydro Partners 
2020 BCCA 339 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 18 (leave to appeal filed, 2021WL762371, S.C.C.). For a detailed discussion of 
inherent jurisdiction, see Madam Justice Georgina R Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra, “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get 
the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in 
Insolvency Matters” (2007), Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 3; Sam Babe, “Recent Use of Statutory Discretion and Inherent 
Jurisdiction in Insolvency and Restructuring” (2020),  Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 365, 2020 CanLIIDocs 3608, online: 
<https://canlii.ca/t/t1wz>. 
91 Babe, ibid., citing R v. Caron 2011 SCC 5 (S.C.C.), at para. 32. 
92 (1998), 43 B.L.R. (2d) 226 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). 
93 Unisource Canada Inc. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada (1998), 43 B.L.R. (2d) 226 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) at para. 134. 
See also Re Burroughs 2013 SKQB 262 (Sask. Q.B.), at para. 25. 
94Re Burroughs, supra, footnote 93. 
95 Re Burroughs, supra, footnote 93, at para. 26. 
96 Lloyd’s Non-Marine Underwriters, supra, footnote 84. The court purported to rely upon the author’s earlier article 
as support for equitable subordination under section 183. My earlier article had asked the question of whether equitable 
subordination could be invoked under section 183. See Telfer, supra, footnote 3, at p. 54. The general conclusion of 
that article was that there was no need to import equitable subordination into Canadian law.  





Mobile Steel test. The court began its analysis by raising the question of “whether the codified 
scheme of distribution of the assets of a bankrupt, under the BIA, can be modified by a court on 
the basis of equitable principles, in particular the proposed notion of equitable subordination.”98 
The court answered that question with a resounding yes. The court was “satisfied that the three-
part test for equitable subordination…is appropriate to be applied in the circumstances of this 
matter and conclude that the claim of Hiland in the bankruptcy of Lacey is to be subordinated until 
all other unsecured claims have been satisfied.”99 The decision in Lloyd’s Non-Marine 
Underwriters has not been followed and must be regarded as an anomaly. Ten years after the 
Lloyd’s decision the Ontario Superior Court of Justice concluded in Doyle Salewski Inc v Scott100 
that “[t]he doctrine of equitable subordination has not however been clearly recognized in 
Canadian law.”101 The review of section 183 jurisprudence confirms that jurisdiction “in equity” 
does not mean principles of fairness to alter the statutory priority scheme of the BIA. 
VI.  EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW 
An important maxim of equity is that “equity follows the law.”102 This principle is relevant 
to the relationship between the principles of equity, the common law and statutes. As noted by the 
authors of Snell’s Equity “rules produced by courts of equity must not be flatly inconsistent with 
 
98 Lloyd’s Non-Marine Underwriters, supra, footnote 84, at para. 32. 
99 Ibid., at para. 54. There are very few cases that support equitable subordination. For another application of equitable 
subordination see S-Marque Inc v. Homburg Industries Ltd [1998] N.S.J. No. 550 (N.S.S.C.). The British Columbia 
Court of Appeal in Laronge Realty Ltd v. Golconda Investments Ltd et al (1986), 7 B.C.L.R. (2d) 90 (B.C.C.A.), at 
para. 29 concluded that it was unnecessary to reach a conclusion on whether equitable subordination was part of 
Canadian law but in a dictum the court stated “I prefer to say no more than that it should not be inferred that there is 
no such jurisdiction available. I would not wish to say anything which would encourage the view that the court does 
not have a long arm to prevent the kind of grossly unjust results which I think would have been achieved had the 
appellants succeeded in the position they took.”  
100 2019 ONSC 5108 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
101 Doyle Salewski Inc., supra, footnote 100, at para. 559. 
102 See Robert L. McWilliams, “Equity Follows the Law” (1908), 66 Cent. L.J. 177; “Equity follows the Law” (1906), 
40 Am. L. Rev. 108; John Ordronaux, “Institutes of Equity as Revealed through its Leading Maxims” (1878), 18 Alb. 
L.J. 326, at p. 328. The principle has been cited by the Supreme Court of Canada. See e.g., Canson, supra, footnote 
34, at para. 54; Pro Swing Inc v. ELTA Golf Inc, 2006  SCC 52 (S.C.C.), at para 22. See MacNaughton and Rappos, 





those established at common law.”103 It is also clear that this maxim applies to statutes: “Equity 
follows the law: Clearly equity may not depart from statute law.”104 The Manitoba Court of Appeal 
in Horch v Horch,105 in referring to the maxim “equity follows the law”, recognized that “the 
relationship between equity and other legal principles has been based on the premise that equitable 
doctrines cannot operate in plain inconsistency with other sources of law, such as statute or the 
common law.”106 In the recent decision of House v Baird,107 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
noted that the maxim “equity follows the law” “most clearly applies to principles of law derived 
from statutes.”108 Therefore, “in the face of clear statutory provisions, equitable remedies cannot 
apply.”109 The court declined to make an order for marshalling in light of the conflict between the 
equitable principle and the “unambiguous wording of the Insurance Act.”110 This has implications 
for equity and the BIA. As noted by Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra: “Equity follows the law, and 
if a provision of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is clear on a particular point, a court of equity 
is bound to apply it, even though the court believes that the result is unfair or unjust.”111    
 The most relevant statutory provision in the BIA to the equitable subordination question is 
the distribution scheme found in section 136 and in section 141 which provides “[s]ubject to this 
Act, all claims proved in a bankruptcy shall be paid rateably.” It is a fundamental principle of 
 
103 John McGhee, Snell’s Equity, 33rd ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), at p. 90.  See e.g., N-Krypt International 
Corp v. LeVasseur 2018 BCCA 20 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 27. 
104 Jill Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (London: Thomson Reuters, 2008), at p. 30; Heydon et al, supra, 
footnote 15, at p. 71.  See e.g., Strata Plan No VIS3305 v. Best 2000 BCSC 935 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 18; JM Voith, 
supra, footnote 15, at para. 116.  
105 2017 MBCA 97 (Man. C.A.). 
106 Horch, supra, footnote 105, at para. 63. 
107 2019 ONSC 1712 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
108 House, supra, footnote 107, at para. 44. 
109 Ibid., at para. 45. 
110 Ibid., at paras. 42, 45. 
111 The Honourable Mr. Justice Lloyd W. Houlden, Mr. Justice Geoffrey B. Morawetz and Dr. Janis P. Sarra, 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, 4th ed (W.L. Can.), at para. I§4. See also 3042073 Canada inc, Re [2000] 
R.J.Q. 1314 (Que. S.C.), at para. 77 (“rules of equity…must give way in the presence of provisions that apply to a 





bankruptcy law that once preferred claims have been paid (and subject to the rights of secured 
creditors) unsecured creditors share on a pro rata basis.112 This was the very basis of the first 
English bankruptcy statute enacted in 1542113 and the pro-rata sharing principle “is viewed as one 
of the foundational principles of bankruptcy law.”114 The Supreme Court of Canada described 
this principle as a “rule of absolute equality”.115 Is it possible to invoke fairness and good 
conscience to disturb this equality of distribution? The case law suggests otherwise. 
 In 1923, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Orzy116 reversed the decision of the judge of 
first instance who had postponed the claim of a creditor until all other claims of creditors had been 
paid in full. A father had extended credit to a son to support the son’s business. The father had 
taken a chattel mortgage over the son’s stock in trade to secure the father’s advancement of credit. 
The son found he could no longer obtain credit from his suppliers because of the existence of the 
chattel mortgage. To facilitate the son’s access to credit with suppliers, the father discharged the 
chattel mortgage and had the son sign promissory notes for the debt. The continued existence of 
the son’s debt to the father was not made known to other creditors. One creditor subsequently 
extended credit on the basis that there was no longer a chattel mortgage. When the son later made 
an assignment in bankruptcy, Fisher J. at first instance found the father’s claim as a creditor to be 
suspicious.117 Fisher J. relied upon “equity and good conscience” and ruled that the father was not 
entitled to a dividend until all other creditors had been paid: 
It would, therefore, be contrary to equity and good conscience for the claimant appellant, 
after having entered into a scheme or conspiracy, as I find he did, with his son, enabling 
his son to defraud his creditors by obtaining credit, to allow him now to compete with 
 
112 Re Gingras automobile Ltée [1962] S.C.R. 676 (S.C.C.), at para. 7. Roderick Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), at p. 281.  
113 Emily Kadens, “The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the Development of Bankruptcy Law” (2010), 
59 Duke L.J. 1229. 
114 Roderick J. Wood, “Subordination Agreements, Bankruptcy and the PPSA” (2010), 49 Can. Bus. L.J. 66, at p. 76. 
115 Re Gingras automobile Ltée [1962] S.C.R. 676 (S.C.C.), at para. 7. 
116 Re Orzy [1924] 1 D.L.R. 250 (Ont. C.A.) [Orzy 1924]. 





the creditors who gave credit to the son, as the claimant intended they should.118 
 
 The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed Fisher J.’s decision. Hodgins J.A. began by citing 
the Bankruptcy Act to the effect that all debts proved in the bankruptcy or under an assignment 
“shall be paid pari passu”.119 For Hodgins J.A., “in bankruptcy the rule of equality is absolute.”120 
Ferguson J.A. agreed holding that “bankruptcy does not permit…the adjustment of the rights and 
privileges of creditors inter se.”121 Thus, once a claim was a provable debt the creditor was entitled 
to a dividend. The Court of Appeal rejected Fisher J.’s conclusion that principles of equity and 
good conscience could alter bankruptcy priorities. Under the Re Orzy principle a court “will not 
apply equitable principles in the distribution of the property of the debtor. The rule of equality is 
absolute in bankruptcy except where the Act itself gives priority to some debts over others.”122  
The Ontario Court of Appeal in US Steel did not consider Re Orzy. 
Re Orzy continues to be followed.123 In 2019, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in  
Doyle Salewski Inc v Scott124 considered a case in which the trustee sought judgments against 17 
defendants. The case involved an illegal Ponzi scheme. For four of the actions the trustee sought 
an order that “the defendants [as creditors] shall not be entitled to claim a dividend in the 
bankruptcy proceedings until all claims of the other creditors have been satisfied.”125 Gomery J. 
concluded that there was no provision in the BIA which would permit such an order and refused 
to rely upon equitable principles to alter the distribution scheme and postpone the claims. The 
 
118  Ibid., at para. 9. 
119  Orzy 1924, supra, footnote 116, at para. 4. 
120 Ibid., at para. 5. 
121 Ibid., at para. 19. 
122 Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, supra, footnote 111, at para. G§161. See also Crozier, supra, footnote 3, at para. 8.  
123 Re Lipson (1923), 3 C.B.R. 640 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 23; Re Canadian Tabulating Card Co [1972] 3 O.R. 648 (Ont. 
S.C.J.), at para. 11; Re Keele-Wilson Supermarkets Ltd (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 771 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 12; Re Rico 
Enterprises Ltd (1994), 24 C.B.R. (3d) 309 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 26; Canada (Attorney General) v. Confederation Life 
Insurance Co (2002), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 182 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 15. 
124Doyle Salewski Inc, supra, footnote 100. 





court followed Re Orzy and held that “the rateability principle trumps equity considerations and is 
only displaced by explicit statutory provisions”. Gomery J. cited Bankruptcy Law in Canada, 4th 
ed for the following principle: 
Though invested with jurisdiction, both in law and equity (s. 183(1)), the court will not 
apply equitable principles in the distribution of the property of the debtor. The rule of 
equality is absolute in bankruptcy except where the Act itself gives priority to some 
debts over others. Once a provable debt is established the creditor is entitled to rank for 
dividend rateably: Orzy, Re.126 
 
Other courts have commented on the relationship between the exercise of equitable powers and 
the existing statutory regime. In Wasserman, Arsenault Ltd v Sone, Farley J. concluded that: 
While the Superior Court of Justice in Bankruptcy is vested by s. 183 (1) of the BIA 
with jurisdiction in law and equity, that does not confer on this Court the ability, 
capacity, or jurisdiction to do something not allowed by the BIA in the sense that that 
statute provides otherwise.127 
 
In 2005, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Sunny Corner Enterprises Inc v St Anne-Nackawic 
Pulp Co (Receiver of) noted that section 183 gave the court jurisdiction in law and in equity but 
importantly stated that “[i]t is well known that section 183 may be invoked so long as its 
application does not conflict with another provision of the BIA.”128 Roderick Wood argues that 
the statutory scheme of distribution in the BIA would appear to rule out the application of equitable 
subordination “completely”: 
Under Canadian bankruptcy legislation, ordinary creditors are given a statutory right to 
share rateably in the bankrupt estate unless the statute postpones their claims. A judicial 
subordination of a claim on grounds other than those permitted by statute would appear 
to interfere with the bankruptcy scheme of distribution.129  
 
 
126 Ibid., at para. 557, citing Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, supra, footnote 111, at G§161. 
127 (2000), 22 C.B.R. (4th) 153 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 7, aff’d Wasserman, Arsenault Ltd v Sone (2002), 33 C.B.R. (4th) 
145 (Ont. C.A.). 
128 2005 NBCA 54 (N.B.C.A.), at para. 13. See also Bulut v. City of Brampton (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), 
at para. 88. (“There is, as the courts recognized, a serious issue as to whether courts should modify explicit priorities 
created by statute, even if the modification arose through the application of equitable principles.”); Re Alary 2016 
BCSC 2108 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 27 (“The Court’s exercise of discretion must be reasonable. It must not erode 
confidence in, or frustrate the purposes of, the insolvency legislation.”)  





VII. FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE OF EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION IN 
CANADIAN LAW 
In Re I Waxman & Sons Ltd,130 Pepall J., as she then was, wrote “[i]t seems to me that the 
importation or application of a doctrine such as equitable subordination should respond to a lacuna 
in our law.”131 There are existing provisions in the BIA which subordinate claims of the type often 
considered in the American doctrine of equitable subordination making the importation of the 
doctrine unnecessary.132 Reilly J. in Unisource Canada Inc v Hongkong Bank of Canada stated: 
It might be noted in passing that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, together with 
provincial legislation such as the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, the Personal Property 
Security Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act provide for a statutory scheme of 
distribution of the estate of a bankrupt that enshrines most of the "equitable principles" 
that form the basis for many "equitable subordination" decisions in American cases (see, 
for example, secs. 3, 4, 91, 95, 96, 100, 101 and 136-147 of the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act). Principles such as settlement of property, fraudulent preferences, 
reviewable transactions and the rules for priority and postponement of claims involving 
non-arm's length transactions or related parties are all recognized within the 
legislation.133 
 
The BIA seeks to postpone the claims of insiders in a number of provisions. For example, section 
137 of the BIA postpones claims of creditors who enter into non-arm’s length transactions with 
the debtor.134 Section 139 also postpones disguised equity claims.135 Insiders are also caught by 
section 140 which provides that no director or officer of that corporation is entitled to have his or 
her claim preferred by section 136 for wages. As one author writes, “[t]hese provisions are 
 
130 (2008), 89 O.R. (3d) 427 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
131 Re Waxman, supra, footnote 130, at para. 34. 
132 See MacNaughton and Rappos, supra, footnote 3; Opolsky, supra, footnote 2; Telfer, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 81-
82; Crozier, supra, footnote 3, at para. 12. 
133 Unisource Canada, supra, footnote 93, at para. 134. 
134 In Alberta Energy Regulator v. Lexin Resources Ltd the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench refused to consider the 
doctrine of equitable subordination because section 137 was “sufficient to determine the issue,” 2018 ABQB 590 
(Alta. Q.B.), at para. 90. In Stone Mountain Resources Holdings Ltd v. Stone Mountain Resources Ltd 2012 ABQB 
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Wing Technologies Corp, 2006 BCCA 49 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 42 that section 139 and the doctrine of equitable 





sufficiently broad that they may cover some of the ground occupied by equitable subordination in 
the US.”136  
Existing Canadian law also responds to the issue of inappropriate behavior on the part of 
creditors and insiders. As Jacob Ziegel writes, “the federal and provincial business corporations 
Acts contain powerful ‘oppression remedy’ provisions which, so far as insiders are concerned, 
may lead to the same results as equitable subordination.”137 If there is any provision in the BIA 
that squarely deals with creditor misconduct or abuse by an insider it is the new good faith 
obligation in insolvency proceedings.138 On November 1, 2019, Parliament added the new duty of 
good faith to the BIA:139 
4.2 (1) Any interested person in any proceedings under this Act shall act in good faith 
with respect to those proceedings. 
 
Concerns about creditor misconduct could be dealt with by the new duty of good faith.  The good 
faith obligation is arguably broader than the concept of equitable subordination. The remedy for 
breach of this good faith obligation is expressed in very broad terms: 
 
136 Opolsky, supra, footnote 2, at p. 6. Now section 101 of the BIA enables the court to grant judgment to the trustee 
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138 BIA, supra, footnote 2, section 4.2. Added, S.C. 2019, c. 29, section 133. See the parallel provision in section 18.6 
of the CCAA. See 9354-9186 Québec inc v. Callidus Capital Corp, 2020 SCC 10 (S.C.C.), at para. 50; Sequestre de 
Media5 Corporation 2020 QCCA 943 (Que. C.A.), at para. 9 (application for leave to appeal to Supreme Court of 
Canada [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 458)); CWB Maxium Financial Inc v. 2026998 Alberta Ltd 2021 ABQB 137 (Alta. Q.B.), 
at para. 38.  On the uncertainty that the new provision creates see Jassmine Girgis, “A Generalized Duty of Good Faith 
in Insolvency Proceedings: Effective or Meaningless?” (2020), 64 Can. Bus. L.J. 98. 
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4.2(2) If the court is satisfied that an interested person fails to act in good faith, on 
application by any interested person, the court may make any order that it considers 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
One author suggests that given the “broad powers granted to courts under these amendments, we 
may see the emergence of the doctrine of equitable subordination under the good faith rubric.”140 
It would be an unfortunate development if Canadian courts were to simply introduce equitable 
subordination when there is a breach of the good faith obligation. The oppression remedy in 
Canadian corporate law statutes similarly grants the courts very broad powers to fashion remedial 
orders but no Canadian court in granting an oppression remedy has sought to import equitable 
subordination as an appropriate response to oppressive behaviour. Under the oppression remedy, 
Canadian courts have fashioned their own remedies, such as director liability, when there is a 
breach of a corporation statute.141 In interpreting the new good faith obligation, Canadian courts 
should develop their own remedy regime rather than relying upon equitable subordination.142 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article has raised the issue of the meaning of “equity” in section 183.143 As Jay 
Westbrook writes, “[f]or a lawyer, ‘equity’ is an enormous word. Far beyond a technical reference 
to a group of courts in England, it evokes broad notions of fair consideration of all the values and 
circumstances that should be weighed in rendering a judicial decision.”144 Justice Douglas adopted 
that broader conception of equity in Pepper v Litton relying upon the court’s equitable jurisdiction 
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to subordinate a claim as a result of the “violation of rules of fair play and good conscience by the 
claimant.”145  
Equitable jurisdiction found in section 183 of the BIA does not represent a broad power to 
reorder statutory priorities based on notions of fairness and good conscience. The section 183 
jurisprudence simply does not support the obiter statement in US Steel that the provision invests 
the court with jurisdiction to equitably subordinate a claim and alter statutory priorities. Canadian 
courts have not adopted a “moral reading”146 of section 183.  Instead, the jurisprudence 
demonstrates that courts in Canada have relied upon section 183 to support traditional equitable 
powers such as rectification and specific performance. The jurisprudence also shows that Canadian 
courts have not relied upon inherent jurisdiction to subordinate claims under section 183. Further, 
the important maxim “equity follows the law” means that “equity may not depart from statute 
law.”147 In US Steel, Strathy C.J.O. did not cite any cases in support of his dictum ignoring the 
1923 decision of Re Orzy148 in which the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the conclusion of the 
judge of first instance that principles of equity and good conscience could alter bankruptcy 
priorities.  To allow equitable subordination under section 183 would be an attempt to ignore the 
“legislative will” of Parliament.149  
There may be no need to import equitable subordination as there are existing provisions in 
the BIA which subordinate claims of the type often considered under the American doctrine of 
equitable subordination. Canadian law also effectively deals with creditor and insider misconduct 
through the oppression remedy and the new statutory duty of good faith. One is reminded of the 
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words of Pepall J., as she then was, in Re I Waxman & Sons Ltd,150 in which she referred to 
equitable subordination and stated: “There is of course a danger associated with taking a doctrine 
divorced from its legal home and applying it to Canada's statutory bankruptcy regime 
unencumbered with deep knowledge of the origin, development and legal system from which it 
originated.”151 
 
150Re Waxman, supra, footnote 130. 
151 Ibid., at para. 33. 
